Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Faculty Scholarship
6-2020

The Law Professor Pipeline
Milan Markovic
Texas A&M University School of Law, mmarkovic@law.tamu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar
Part of the Law and Society Commons, Legal Education Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons

Recommended Citation
Milan Markovic, The Law Professor Pipeline, 92 Temp. L. Rev. 813 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1408

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu.

THE LAW PROFESSOR PIPELINE
Milan Markovic*
ABSTRACT

Throughout U.S. legal education'shistory, a small number of elite law schools
have produced the vast majority of law professors. Although law professor hiring is
now more inclusive in certain respects, the law school an aspiringprofessor attended
continues to serve as a powerful predictor of hiring market success. Some scholars
have maintained that this preference for graduates of elite law schools infects legal
education with class bias and distorts legalpedagogy, but the absence of reliable data
on socioeconomic diversity within law schools has muted these criticisms.
This Essay reorients the debate on law school hiring by focusing on law
professors' undergraduate educations. This shift in focus is important for two main
reasons. First, researchershave gathered reliable socioeconomic data on the student
bodies of U.S. colleges, data that do not currently exist for law schools. Second,
undergraduateeducation does not provide legal trainingor otherwise prepare students
for legal academiaand therefore should play little to no role in hiring.
Drawing on entry-level hiring information from the last three years, I find that
new law professors graduatedpredominatelyfrom elite private colleges that serve the
wealthiest strata of U.S. society. The median hire attended a college in which 67% of
students come from families in the top income quintile, and only a fraction of students
come from families in the bottom three quintiles. Whatever professors' individual
backgrounds, beginning in college they are socialized in highly privileged
environments that shape their pedagogy and research. This Essay concludes by
describing legal education'smarginalizationof non-elite views of the legal system and
suggesting that hiring practices should be restructured to allow for a more
socioeconomicallydiverse professoriate.
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INTRODUCTION

U.S. law schools train the next generation of lawyers, judges, and political
leaders. But that is only part of their mission. If one takes their rhetoric at face value,
they also uplift their graduates and prepare them to advance social justice.1 In the
words of one law school dean, law schools are "engines of access, opportunity, and
social transformation." 2
Not all legal educators regard law schools as catalysts for social transformation
and change. Professor Duncan Kennedy famously charged that law schools reproduce
hierarchy and cause students to believe that "it is natural, efficient, and fair for law
firms, the bar as a whole, and the society the bar services to be organized in their actual
patterns of hierarchy and domination." 3 Law schools have evolved since Kennedy's
polemic -and
certainly since the time of Langdell and Kingsfield. 5 But there
continues to be an open question of whether they are structured to challenge
longstanding societal hierarchies. 6

1. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Truth, Justice and White Paper, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 319, 319
(1992) ("American law schools . .
have become a tad smug about the centrality of their contribution to the
advance of western civilization and its several institutions of justice."); Julie D. Lawton, Teaching Social
Justice in Law Schools. Whose Morality Is It?, 50 IND. L. REV. 813, 836 (2017) ("[L]aw schools have a
responsibility to teach social justice, and this exposure is an essential part of legal education.").
2. Margaret Raymond, Letter to the Editor, Most Law Schools Are Good for Democracy, CHRON.
HIGHER ED. (Dec. 20, 2018), http://web.archive.org/web/20190105191900/https://www.chronicle.com/
blogs/letters/most-law-schools-are-good-for-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/HRB5-JJHG].
3.
(1982).

Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction ofHierarchy, 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 591, 591

4. See Blake D. Momnt, The Continued Evolution ofAmerican Legal Education, 51 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 245, 250-52 (2016); see also Franklin G. Snyder, Late Night Thoughts on Blogging While Reading
Duncan Kennedy's Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy in an Arkansas Motel Room, 11
NEXUS 111, 113-14 (2006) (criticizing Kennedy's conviction that his own experiences as a member of
Harvard Law School's faculty are "true and universal" of legal education generally); Mark V. Tushnet & Louis
M. Seidman, On Being Old Codgers. A ConversationAbout A Half Century in Legal Education 2 (2019)
(unpublished
manuscript),
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3 175&
context-facpub [https://perma.cc/5PSV-ZUMX] ("Today law schools tend to be much more collaborative and
less hard-edged.").
5. For a discussion of Langdell's influence on legal education, see injra Part IV. Kingsfield is the
fictional contracts professor in the 1973 film The Paper Chase. THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. 1973).
6. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A LAWYER"
5-6 (2007). One qualitative study of legal educations finds that "[legal training focuses students' attention
away from a systematic or comprehensive consideration of social context. . . . Similarly, legal language
discourages students from overt consideration of morality." Id.; see also Mark Edwin Burge, Without
Precedent. Legal Analysis in the Age of Non-Judicial Dispute Resolution, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
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Consider law school hiring practices. Empirical research has confirmed that the
legal academy is not diverse in terms of race, gender, and educational background.7
Law schools have made strides across the former two dimensions even though
inequities persist, particularly vis-A-vis satisfaction and retention.8 Yet, with respect to
law professors' educational backgrounds, law schools largely hire in lockstep, focusing
on candidates with elite pedigrees who may-or may not-make the best law
professors.9 At the top ten U.S. law schools, 94% of professors are themselves
graduates of top ten law schools.1 0 There is more diversity as one moves down the law
school hierarchy, but graduates of elite law schools dominate the market as a whole,
and law schools almost never hire candidates who attended law schools less prestigious
than their own. 1 Controlling for publications and other factors, graduating from one of
the three law schools that sit atop the U.S. News and World Report rankings
significantly increases the odds of obtaining tenure-track positions. 12
According to some legal scholars, this emphasis on law school pedigree
undermines the law professoriate's socioeconomic diversity.13 Elite credentials strongly
correlate with socioeconomic privilege because law schools rely on admission criteria,
such as the Law School Admission Test (LSAT), that favor applicants from wealthier
backgrounds.1 Law students do not chance into elite law schools; rather, their families

143, 146 (2013) ("While legal education today is delivered more gently than by either Langdell or Kingsfield,
it still seeks the same results."); cf Jeffrey L. Harrison, Confess'n the Blues. Some Thoughts on Class Bias in
Law School Hiring, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 119, 120 (1992) (suggesting that law professors "have been sheltered
from the wrong side of our lopsided economy").
7. See, e.g., MEERA E. DEO, UNEQUAL PROFESSION: RACE AND GENDER IN LEGAL ACADEMIA 4 (2019);
see also Michael J. Higdon, A Place in the Academy. Law Faculty Hiring and Socioeconomic Bias, 87 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 171, 194-95 (2013) (criticizing law schools for failing to foster socioeconomic diversity);
Steven A. Ramirez, Foreword Diversity in the Legal Academy After Fisher II, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 979,
980 (2018) (noting that only about 18% of full-time law school faculty are nonwhite).
8. For an excellent discussion of the challenges that women of color face in legal academia in
particular, see DEO, supra note 7, at 6-7.
9. See Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn fom Billy Beane and the Oakland
Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1507-08 (2004) (book review); see also DEO, supra note 7, at 13-14 (noting
that requirements such as graduating from a highly ranked school and serving on law review have not been
shown to correlate with success in legal academia).
10. Eric J. Segall & Adam Feldman, The Elite Teaching the Elite. Who Gets Hired by the Top Law
Schools?, 68 J. LEGAL EDUC. (forthcoming 2020), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstmct
id=3279878 [https://perma.cc/4YDA-GQSZ].
11. See Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Labor Market for New Law Professors, 11 J.
EMIRICAL LEGAL STUDS. 1, 7 (2014).
12.

Id. at 32.

13.

See, e.g., Higdon, supra note 7, at 191-93; Segall & Feldman, supra note 10.

14. Lucille A. Jewel, Oil and Water. How Legal Education's Doctrine and Skills Divide Reproduces
Toxic Hierarchies, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 117 (2015); see also RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN
LAWYERS 89 (1989) ("Because, there is a strong correlation between family income, scores on the Law School
Admission Test, and undergraduate grade point average, admissions criteria tend to exclude lower class
applicants."); Lawprofblawg & Darren Bush, Law Reviews, Citations Counts, and Twitter (Oh my!). Behind
the Curtains of the Law Professor'sSearch for Meaning, 50 LoY. CHI. L.J. 327, 344 (2018) ("To get to an elite
law school, a prospective student needs to have a good LSAT. [Socioeconomic status (SES)] plays a role
here . . . . Even students from lower SES who do well on standardized tests may not choose to go to an elite
institution." (footnote omitted)).
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likely poured substantial resources into their educations, with elite law schools only the
last links in chains of rigorous schooling that began as early as preschool." For
students of modest backgrounds, the journey is far more perilous and can be stymied in
a variety of ways, including by a lack of awareness of educational hierarchies. 16
The legal academy's alleged exclusion of individuals from less advantaged
backgrounds would be antithetical to its commitments to justice and equality." But the
absence of socioeconomic diversity could also undermine legal education by alienating
students who do not share their professors' elevated statuses and leaving graduates
ill-prepared to serve clients of modest means." Without non-elite perspectives, law
faculties may also be inclined to produce scholarship that takes for granted class-based
orthodoxies and shibboleths.19
Few would deny that wealth is an advantage in the law school admissions
process. 20 However, discussions of class and the legal academy are often short circuited
by the absence of reliable data on law schools' socioeconomic diversity. 2 1 Much of
what is known about class in U.S. law schools is anecdotal. The only modern study that
has examined socioeconomic status (SES) in law schools found that students differ
based on the tier of their law schools but are nevertheless of high SES. 2 2

15.

DANIEL MARKOVITS, THE MERITOCRACY TRAP: How AMERICA'S FOUNDATIONAL MYTH FEEDS

INEQUALITY, DISMANTLES THE MIDDLE CLASS, AND DEVOURS THE ELITE 6-7 (2019).

16.

Lawprofblawg & Bush, supra note 14, at 345.

17.

See Harrison, supra note 6, at 120.

18.

See id. at 120-21.

19. See generally Richard L. Abel, The Rise of Professionalism, 6 BRIT. J.L. & SoCY 82, 87 (1979)
(book review) (noting that legal scholarship is impractical and legitimates the legal system by obscuring law's
esoteric and arbitrary nature). Scholars have criticized the legal academy's ongoing preoccupation with
economic efficiency in particular. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?: A Response to Professors
Calabresi and Posner, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980); Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1649 (2018).
20. See, e.g., Higdon, supra note 7, at 189 (noting that wealthy students benefit from resources that
result in higher test scores and grade inflation at elite colleges); Eli Wald, A Primer on Diversity,
Discrimination, and Equality in the Legal Profession or Who Is Responsible for PursuingDiversity and Why,

24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1079, 1098 (2011) (noting wealthy students' advantages in preparing for the LSAT).
21. See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Law Schools as a Proxy for Class, PRAwFSBLAWG (Aug. 29, 2019,
10:14
AM),
http://pmwfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/20 18/08/law-schools-as-a-proxy-for-class.html
[https://perma.cc/S64K-JRZ7] (mentioning that what appears to be the best data set on socioeconomic status in
law school does not include family income). On the use of law school attended as a proxy for class, compare
id. (questioning whether elite and non-elite law schools differ in terms of their students' socioeconomic
backgrounds), with Lawprofblawg, Classism in Academia, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 28, 2019, 12:00 PM),
http://abovethelaw.com/2018/08/classism-in-academia/
[https://perma.cc/S9WB-9USE]
(highlighting
wealth-based barriers to admission into an elite law school).
22. Richard H. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 639 (2011).
Professor Sander's empirical research, based on data from the After the JD study, found that 82% of graduates
of the top ten law schools are in the top quartile of socioeconomic status compared to 58% of graduates of
schools ranked 101st and lower. Id. Importantly, the After the JD study solicited information about parental
occupation and education but not incomes. See id. at 634. Using the same data, Professors Ronit Dinovitzer
and Bryant Garth reported that two-thirds of graduates of top ten law schools had fathers who completed some
graduate education compared to one-third for graduates of fourth-tier law schools. Ronit Dinovitzer & Bryant
G. Garth, Lawyer Satisfaction in the Process ofStructuringLegal Careers, 41 L. & SoCY REV. 1, 11 (2007).

2020]

THE LAW PROFESSOR PIPELINE

8 17

This Essay reorients the debate on law school Wiring and class by focusing on law
professors' undergraduate educations. This shift in focus is important for two main
reasons. First, researchers have gathered reliable socioeconomic data on the student
bodies of U.S. colleges, data that do not currently exist for law schools. These data
show that the most elite U.S. colleges tend to have the least socioeconomic diversity,
notwithstanding relatively generous financial aid policies. 23 Second, undergraduate
education does not provide legal training or otherwise prepare students for legal
academia and therefore should play little to no role in hiring, whereas law school
education could conceivably have some effect on an individual's legal scholarship and
teaching. 24
Relying on law schools' entry-level hiring data for the last three years, as well as
parental income data by college drawn from government records, I find that law
professors generally graduate from private colleges that serve the wealthiest strata of
U.S. society and not more socioeconomically diverse public colleges. The median hire
attended an institution in which 67% of the students come from the top income quintile
and only a fraction of students come from the bottom three quintiles. Most professors
come from privileged backgrounds, and those who do not are generally educated and
socialized in this milieu before attending an elite law school. 25 These early experiences
are bound to acculturate professors and shape their interests and understandings of the
legal system. Individual law professors have little incentive to buck this paradigm by
concentrating on the experiences of low- and middle-income people in their teaching
and scholarship.
Section I of this Essay introduces law schools' historical hiring practices and the
claims of socioeconomic bias. Section II provides information about entry-level law
professor hires from 2017 to 2019, which is cross-referenced with estimates of parental
income by college. Section III demonstrates that recent hires attended undergraduate
institutions in which the vast majority of students come from families in the top income
quintile, with very few attending socioeconomically diverse colleges. Section IV
concludes by connecting law school hiring practices to law professors' pedagogies and
research interests and legal education's lack of attention to low- and middle-income
people's interactions with the legal system.

23. See James C. Hearn & Kelly Ochs Rosinger, Socioeconomic Diversity in Selective Private
Colleges: An OrganizationalAnalysis, 38 REV. HIGHER ED. 71, 74 (2014) ("[T]he great majority of students in

all of the most selective and expensive schools come from relatively advantaged backgrounds. Numerous
studies have found that those institutions lag far behind others in enrolling socioeconomically diverse student
bodies...." (citations omitted)).
24. See Hessick, supra note 21 (speculating that elite law schools such as Harvard and Yale may
provide better preparation for legal academia by emphasizing and providing opportunities for academic
writing).
25. See Ryan D. Padgett et al., The Impact of College Student Socialization, Social Class, and Race on
Needfor Cognition, 145 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INST. RES. 99, 100 (2010) ("[S]ocialization entails learning the

appropriate behaviors and attitudes of the group, facilitated by interactions with others who exemplify the
norms of the particular group.").
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I. A PRIMER ON LAW SCHOOL HIRING
Law schools' Wiring practices are largely entrenched and rely on proxies to
identify candidates with the most scholarly and teaching potential. In general, law
schools hire graduates of elite law schools after they have clerked for a federal judge
(preferably an appellate judge, with Supreme Court experience especially valued) and
practiced for a few years (but not too many). 26 While candidates would once enter the
hiring market with only one or two publications, scholarship expectations have
increased in recent years. 27 A PhD or fellowship appears to have become a de facto
requirement.

28

Formerly an old boys' club, where law schools hired via word of mouth, law
school hiring is now systematized, with most hiring completed in connection with the
Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Faculty Recruitment Conference (FRC)
held annually in Washington, D.C. 29 Part of the impetus for the FRC's creation was to
make law professor hiring more equitable and efficient.30
Both candidates and law schools pay to participate in the AALS FRC. Candidates
submit information about their educations, professional experiences, teaching interests,
and scholarships to the FRC, and law schools extend screening interview offers to their
preferred candidates.3 1 After the FRC interviews, law schools will customarily invite a
few of the most impressive interviewees to campus.3 2 Competition for tenure-track

26.

See George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 37 ("Nearly all new hires in our study attended a small set of

schools that are more likely to emphasize theory over practice. The new hires have a shared set of professional
experiences .... Missing from those experiences is substantial time outside of a law school."); Deborah Jones
Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials. The Truth About Affirmative Action in Law Faculty

Hiring, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 240 (1997) ("Graduation from a prestigious college and law school,
experience as a Supreme Court clerk, and possession of a doctoral degree in a field other than law all
significantly increased the likelihood that a professor would teach at an elite law school."); Richard E.
Redding, "Where Did You Go to Law School?". Gatekeepingfor the Professoriateand Its Implicationsfor
Legal Education, 53 J. LEGALEDUC. 594, 596-97 (2003).
27. Compare Don Zillman et al., Uncloaking Law School Hiring. A Recruit's Guide to the AALS
FacultyRecruitment Conference, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 345, 347 (1988) (suggesting that some hiring conuittees
prefer prior publication), with BRANNON P. DENNING ET AL., BECOMING A LAW PROFESSOR: A CANDIDATE'S
GuIDE 28 (2010) ("Publishing good legal scholarship is one way-we would say the way-to distinguish
yourself as a candidate. In fact it is becoming essential.").
28. See Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring Report 2019. Doctrinal, Fellowship,
Doctorate, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 6, 2019, 4:44 PM), http://pmwfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2019/06/

spring-self-reported-entry-level-hiring-report-2019-doctrinal-fellowship-doctomte.html

[https://perma.cc/

8U6Z-RYLJ]; see also Minna J. Kotkin, Clinical Legal Education and the Replication of Hierarchy, 26
CLINICAL L. REV. 287, 288 (2019) (observing the "trend in tenure-track hiring that privileges advanced degrees

and fellowship-driven scholarship over significant practice experience"). In 2019 96% of entry-level hires had
completed a PhD or fellowship. Lawsky, supra.
29. See Daniel Gordon, Hiring Law Professors. Breaking the Back of an American Plutocratic
Oligarchy, 19 WIDENER L.J. 137, 137, 153 (2009); Zillman et al., supra note 27, at 345. But see id. at 346-47
(discussing informal methods of seeking a law faculty position).
30.

See Zillman et al., supra note 27, at 347.

3 1.

See id.

32.

Id. at 356-57.
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positions is fierce. In any given year, only 13% or so of FRC participants will obtain a
tenure-track position.33
Some scholars have castigated law schools for elitist and antimeritocratic hiring,
noting that they place inordinate emphasis on the law schools that candidates
attended a questionable proxy for scholarly and teaching potential.3 4 Since
lower-ranked schools tend to have more students from lower-income backgrounds than
elite schools do, this hiring practice limits the professoriate's socioeconomic diversity,
particularly when considered alongside law schools' preference for candidates who
complete low-paid fellowships or PhDs.3 5 One legal education critic has likened the
system for hiring law professors to "a plutocratic oligarchy" whereby "a group of law
professors who are the product of wealth-based education control the hiring of more
law professors who are also the product of wealth-based education." 3 6
The AALS does not generally afford researchers access to FRC candidate
information. However, Professors Tracey George and Albert Yoon collaborated with
the AALS during the 2007 to 2008 hiring season to study the labor market for
entry-level law professors.3 7 Although Professors George and Yoon did not assess SES,
their study provides strong support for the conventional wisdom that, ceteris paribus,
graduates of elite law schools fare much better on the hiring market than do graduates
of lower-ranked schools.
The George and Yoon study measured candidates' likelihoods of receiving
screening interviews, callback interviews, and tenure-track offers.3 8 Factors such as
publishing in a highly ranked law review and completing a fellowship increased the
odds of receiving a screening interview offer, whereas too much practice experience
decreased the odds. 3 9 The rank of a candidate's law school had no effect at this initial
stage. 40 However, the authors found that law school rank was significant at the callback
and offer stages. After controlling for publications and other factors, graduates of Yale,

33.

Gordon, supra note 29, at 138; see also George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 2.

34. Numerous scholars have questioned the correlation. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 29, at 153 ("Law
school faculty recruitment reinforces a bias toward the product of wealth, allowing wealth-based education to
masquerade as quality education."); Harrison, supra note 6, at 122 (questioning whether "good grades at an
elite school and a clerkship are somehow correlated with a future of being a productive law teacher"); see also
Kevin H. Smith, How To Become a Law Professor Without Really Trying: A Critical, Heuristic,
Deconstructionist, and Hermeneutical Exploration of Avoiding the Drudgery Associated with Actually

Working as an Attorney, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 147 (1998) (claiming that candidate success depends on
having attended "a school accredited as belonging to the Almighty-Bunch-of-(Educational-)Aristocmts");
Elyce H. Zenoff & Jerome A. Barron, So You Want To Hire a Law Professor?, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 492, 493
(1983) (suggesting that law professors predominately hire narrow versions of themselves). A recent article by
Professors Adam Chilton, Jonathan Masur, and Kyle Rozema determined that law schools would be able to
significantly increase scholarly output by increasing tenure denial rates, suggesting that entry-level
decisionmaking is suboptimal and is not being corrected. Adam Chilton et al., Rethinking Law School Tenure
Standards 40 (Univ. of Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Economics, Research Paper No. 887, 2019),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstmctid=3200005 [https://perma.cc/7FCN-QY4R].
35.

See Sander, supra note 22, at 639.

36.

Gordon, supra note 29, at 149.

37.

See George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 1.

38.

Id. at 24-32.

39.

Id. at 27.

40.

Id. at 27-28.
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Harvard, and Stanford law schools were 18% more likely to obtain callback interviews
and 27% more likely to receive offers than graduates of the other top fifty law
schools."
Law schools' marked emphasis on law school pedigree-over even candidates'
publications-is somewhat puzzling.4 2 Yet it cannot necessarily be attributed to class
bias without reliable data on socioeconomic diversity in elite versus non-elite law
schools.4 3 Faced with the task of projecting the teaching and scholarly productivity of a
plethora of accomplished entry-level candidates, law schools may fall back on
institutional prestige to cull the field. 4 Graduates of elite law schools may also have
unobserved qualities that better prepare them for legal academia or may simply receive
better mentoring on the ins and outs of the hiring market." Law is hardly the only
academic field concerned with academic pedigree.4 6 However, as set out below, the
concern for pedigree is not limited to candidates' choices of law schools.
II. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
To study class and law professor hiring, I draw upon two distinct
datasets: parental income data by college from Opportunity Insights and entry-level law
school hiring data collected from 2017 to 2019. Undergraduate education provides
valuable clues as to the SES of law professors but, unlike law school pedigree, should
presumably have minimal bearing on law schools' hiring decisions.
Opportunity Insights relies on big data to address pressing policy problems such
as economic mobility.4 7 Its researchers have used social security and tax records to
create a dataset tying college attendance to parental incomes. 8 One of its central
findings is that the elite U.S. colleges lack socioeconomic diversity.4 9 For example, at
Ivy-Plus colleges-the Ivy League (Brown, Columbia, Cornell, Dartmouth, Harvard,
Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania, and Yale) plus Stanford, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT), the University of Chicago, and Duke-only 3.8% of
students come from families in the bottom income quintile.so These disparities exist

41.

Id. at 29, 33.

42.

See id. at 33.

43.

See Hessick, supra note 21.

44. See George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 15; see also Gordon, supra note 29, at 144 (noting that the
initial review of candidates can take between fourteen and fifty-seven hours).
45. See Redding, supra note 26, at 608-09 (2003) (describing the "better horse" theory of hiring,
whereby law schools treat law school attended as a mark of intelligence and scholarly potential); see also
George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 16 (highlighting the importance of elite law schools' research networks);
Hessick, supra note 21 (intimating that law schools such as Yale and Harvard may "do a better job teaching
their students about academic writing").
46. See George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 15-16 (summarizing research on queuing theory in
academia).
47. See OPPORTUNITY INSIGHTS, http://opportunityinsights.org/ [https://perma.cc/VE2G-BKCS]
visited May 1, 2020).

(last

48. See Raj Chetty et al., Mobility Report Cards: The Role of Colleges in IntergenerationalMobility 1,
6-7 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23618, 2017), http://opportunityinsights.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/03/coll mrcpaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6KR-FTSH].
49.

See id. at 14-15.

50.

Id. at 14.
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even though elite colleges offer admitted students sizeable financial aid packages. For a
variety of reasons, highly qualified low-income students often do not apply to elite
colleges and instead pay more to attend less selective institutions."
The Opportunity Insights dataset covers students who were in college in the early
2000s and specifies, per college, the percentage of students from families in each
income quintile.5 2 Students who are part of this cohort were in their mid-to-late thirties
from 2017 to 2019, approximately the same age as the median entry-level law
professor.5 3 The percentage of lower-income students per college also does not vary
greatly over time." For example, Ivy-Plus colleges' enrollments of students from the
bottom income quintile did not change from 2000 to 2011.11
To construct the law professor database, I relied on entry-level hiring information
that Professor Sarah Lawsky collected and shared on Prawfsblawg, a website that legal
academics frequent.5 6 I focused on new law professors because higher education was
more affordable decades ago, and colleges could have therefore been more
socioeconomically diverse. 7 While new professors and their hiring schools need not
share hiring information, they have reputational incentives to do so. Lawsky's dataset
includes information about, inter alia, hires' legal educations, fellowships, other
degrees, and subject matter interests. 58 Lawsky also separates tenure-track hires from
non-tenure-track hires, unlike other potential sources of hiring information such as the
AALS Directory ofLaw Teachers.59

51.

This phenomenon is called "undermatching." Caroline Hoxby & Christopher Avery, The Missing

"One-Offs": The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving Low Income Students, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON.

.

ACTIVITY, Spring 2013, at 1, 2-4 (defining "undermatching" as the tendency of lower-income students to not
apply to selective universities and instead to enroll in less selective universities that would charge them higher
tuition); see also Goodwin Liu, Three Challengesfor American Higher Education, 7 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 9, 13
(2017); Ann L. Mullen, Elite Destinations. Pathways to Attending an Ivy-League University, 30 BRIT. J. Soc.
EDUC. 15, 25 (2009) ("What stands out in [lower-income] students' accounts is how commonly Ivy League
institutions were initially not even considered as possible college destinations. . . . Some less-advantaged
students also revealed a striking disinclination to attend elite universities because, instead of imagining feeling
at home, they anticipate the discomfort of not fitting in. .
52.

Chetty et al., supra note 48, at 9-10.

53. Professors George and Yoon noted that the median candidate in the AALS FRC completed law
school nine years before seeking a tenure-track position. George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 19-20.
54.

See Chetty et al., supra note 48, at 4-5.

55. Id. at 36-37; cf Hearn & Rosinger, supra note 23, at 74 ("While the late 20th-century shift toward
mass higher education in the United States greatly expanded postsecondary access among all social classes,
students' specific college choices have remained closely linked to socioeconomic background.").
56. See, e.g., Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring Report 2019, PRAwFSBLAWG
(June 4, 2019, 4:03 PM), http://pmwfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2019/06/spring-self-reported-entrylevel-hiring-report-2019.html [https://perma.cc/8DVJ-GBBD].
57. See Laura W. Perna & Chunyan Li, College Affordability. Implicationsfor College Opportunity, 36
NASFAA J. STUDENT FIN. AID 7, 11-14 (2006). Professors Laura Perna and Chunyan Li noted that,
2
controlling for inflation, "median family income increased by % between [1994-2005], while over the same
42
period tuition and fees increased by 59% at public four-year institutions and
% at private four-year
institutions." Id. at 11.
58.

Lawsky, supra note 56.

59.

Id.
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According to Lawsky's final dataset, law schools made 264 entry-level hires from
2017 to 2019.60 I supplemented the dataset with new hires' undergraduate institutions.
Sixty-seven of the hires were ultimately excluded from the analysis because they
earned their undergraduate degrees outside of the United States or were hired to a
non-tenure-track position. The final sample consists of 197 law professors.
III. ANALYSIS
Law professors are expected to "prepare[] ... students for admission to the bar,
and [for] effective and responsible participation in the legal profession" 61 as well as to
engage in "continuous and energetic study of new developments in [the law]."62
Undergraduate education does not provide preparation for these and other professorial
tasks, and college prestige should presumably be irrelevant to the hiring process. Yet,
law schools appear to hire mostly graduates of elite colleges.
As set out in Figure 1, 40% of law professors in the final sample attended
Ivy-Plus colleges. Only 27% attended public colleges.
FIGURE

1

LAW PROFESSOR HIRES BY UNDERGRADUATE INSTITUTION TYPE

The most common "other private" colleges attended by law professors in the
sample included elite institutions such as Georgetown University, New York
University, and Vanderbilt University, as well as non-elite but selective institutions

60. Lawsky posts her report each year to PrawfsBlawg with a link to the data. See Lawsky, supra note
56; Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring Report 2018, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 21, 2018,
10:43
AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2018/05/spring-self-reported-entry-level-hiringreport-2018.html [https://perma.cc/C4LS-CY3J]; Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level Hiring
Report 2017, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 1, 2017, 1:06 PM), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2017/06/spring-self-reported-entry-level-hiring-report-2017.html [https://perma.cc/GF4N-YJPG].
61.
AND

Gordon, supra note 29, at 139-40 (alterations in original) (quoting AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS

RULES

OF

PROCEDURE

FOR

APPROVAL

OF

LAW

SCHOOLS

2009-2010,

at

19

(2009),

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dami/aba/publications/misc/legal education/Standards/standardsarchive/2
009_2010_standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/V37Y-NFFP]).
62.

Id. at 140 (quoting ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., 2009 HANDBOOKS

§ 6-4(a)

(2009)).
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such as Baylor University and Brigham Young University (BYU).63 Even if one
assumes that private colleges generally provide more preparation for graduate school
than public colleges do, this disparity is striking because leading public colleges serve
many more students than leading private ones.6 4
Figure 2 displays the twelve colleges that had at least four or more of their
graduates hired to the legal academy from 2017 to 2019.
FIGURE 2
MOST COMMON UNDERGRADUATE INSTITUTIONS AMONG LAW PROFESSOR HIRES

4

44

Unsurprisingly, nine of the twelve are Ivy-Plus, and only two are public colleges.
Just three Ivy-Plus colleges Harvard, Yale, and Stanford produced thirty-eight law
professors among them.6 5 Without access to the AALS FRC candidate pool, it is
impossible to determine whether graduating from any of these institutions has an
independent effect on the odds of receiving a tenure-track position. But these
descriptive results imply that law schools' tendency to hire from Harvard, Yale, and
Stanford law schools6 6 extend to the undergraduate level.
One reason for this trend could be that graduates of Ivy-Plus colleges are
overrepresented at the elite law schools from which law schools prefer to hire law

63. Three law professors attended each of Georgetown, New York University, Vanderbilt, and Baylor.
Five law professors attended BYU, three of whom were hired by BYU's Law School.
64. For example, the undergraduate enrollment of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor was 30,318
compared to 5,964 at Yale University. Compare Student Profile, U. MICH., http://admissions.umich.edu/
apply/freshmen-applicants/student-profile [https://perma.cc/8CRQ-EW2L] (last visited May 1, 2020), with
Fast Facts, YALE U., http://www.yale.edu/about-yale/yale-facts [https://perma.cc/A5LL-HPJX] (last visited
May 1, 2020).
65. Twenty-four of these professors also attended one of Harvard, Yale, or Stanford for law school.
66. George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 28-29, 32-33.
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professors.6 7 However, elite law schools do not just draw students from elite private
colleges. Harvard Law School enrolled graduates of 185 different colleges in 2019.68 In
addition, Ivy-Plus colleges have small student bodies and therefore send far fewer
students to law school than elite public colleges.6 9 The top law school feeder colleges
are all public institutions, and the top feeder college, the elite University of California,
Los Angeles (UCLA), sends three times as many students to law school every year than
does Yale.7 0

Regardless of the precise cause, law schools' seeming preference for graduates of
Ivy-Plus and similar colleges is problematic for the professoriate's socioeconomic
diversity. The United States has substantial income inequality, with nearly half of total
U.S. income going to families in the top income decile. 1 This inequality is very much
reflected in higher education:
In recent decades, resource and prestige hierarchies have risen sharply within
the postsecondary sector, and top status groups fight to place their children
in private elite colleges and universities rather than in less selective public
campuses or lower-ranked private institutions. . . . [T]he modem U.S. class
system itself is constituted in large measure by the increasing organizational
variety of college and university types, with elites with the right class culture
dominating the top of the horizontally stratified system.7 2
These "elites with the right class culture" dominate most of the colleges that law
professor hires attended. Figure 3 sets out the percentage of students from families in
the top income quintile for the top undergraduate institutions in the law professor
sample. The percentage of students from families in the bottom three quintiles is also
included for comparison.

67. See MARKOVITS, supra note 15, at 7 (suggesting that elite law schools admit only a few students a
year from non-elite colleges).
68. Undergraduate Institutions, HARV. L. SCH., http://hls.harvard.edu/dept/jdadmissions/applyto-harvard-law-school/undergmduate-colleges/ [https://perma.cc/YZL7-RN55] (last visited May 1, 2020).
69.

See ACCESSLEX INST., LAW SCHOOL APPLICANTS BY DEGREES: A PER CAPITA ANALYSIS OF THE

ToP FEEDER SCHOOLS 7 (2018), http://www.accesslex.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/Law%/`20School%/
20Applicants%20by%2ODegrees Per% 2OCapita Mar2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YCC-PJ26].
70.

See id.

71. Sam Goldrick-Rab et al., Reducing Income Inequality in EducationalAttainment Experimental
Evidence on the Impact ofFinancialAid on College Completion, 121 AM. J. SOC. 1762, 1762-63 (2016).
72. See Amy J. Binder & Andrea R. Abel, Symbolically Maintained Inequality. How Harvard and
Stanford Students Construct BoundariesAmong Elite Universities, 92 SoC. EDUC. 41, 43 (2019) (citations
omitted).
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FIGURE 3
PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES IN TOP INCOME QUINTILE AND BOTTOM THREE QUINTILES

As Figure 3 illustrates, nine of the twelve undergraduate colleges have two-thirds
of their students come from families in the top income quintile. Brown, Dartmouth,
Princeton, and Yale have over 70%. The results are similar when the entire law
professor sample is considered. The median college that appears in the law professor
dataset draws 67% of its student body from families in the top income quintile.
enrollments of low- and middle-income
3-the University of Chicago and the
20% or more of their students from
Brown and Princeton have five times as
many students from families in the top income quintile than they do in the bottom three
quintiles. Thus, contrary to the perception of elite colleges as engines for social
mobility, these institutions more often pass on and cement pirivilege.73 Unless new law
Equally striking are these colleges' low
students. Only two colleges listed in Figure
University of North Carolina (UNC)-have
families in the bottom three income quintiles.

professor hires differ substantially from their college classmates, the vast majority
come from relatively wealthy families.
Regardless of individual backgrounds, few law professors attended colleges with
meaningful socioeconomic diversity. For example, a selective public institution such as
Temple University draws 69% of its students from families that are outside of the top
quintile. Yet, as Figure 4 indicates, it is uncommon for law professors to attend such
institutions.

73.

See id. at 42.
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FIGuRE 4
NUMBER OF PROFESSOR HIRES BY UNDERGRADUATE SOCIOECONOMIC DIVERSITY
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PERCENTAGE OF FAMILIES IN TOP QUINTILE

Only 19% of law professors in the sample attended an institution in which 50% of
the students come from families outside of the top quintile, with only one professor
having attended a college with less than a quarter of its students from families in the
top income quintile. Law faculty would likely condemn such stratification in other
contexts. 74
Thus, even if certain law professors do not come from great means, they still
disproportionately attended colleges dominated by economically advantaged students.
Inevitably, college would have exposed them to wealth and its trappings in interactions
with fellow students, professors, and administrators.75 Lower-income students in elite
colleges are highly conscious of class-based differences and engage in a number of
coping strategies, including assimilation of speech, attire, and behavior. 76 These
foundational experiences would have then been carried to law school, post-law school
employment, and eventually the academy.77

74. Raj Chetty and colleagues observed that "the degree of income segregation across colleges is
comparable to the degree of income segregation across neighborhoods in the average American city." Chetty et
al., supra note 48, at 1-2.
75. See Padgett etal., supra note 25, at 100-01.
76. See Elizabeth Aries & Maynard Seider, The Interactive RelationshipBetween Class Identity and the
College Experience: The Case of Lower Income Students, 28 QUALITATIVE Soc. 419, 431 (2005); Harrison,

supra note 6, at 121 ("[S]potting people who are socially and economically disadvantaged is not always easy,
especially if they have caught on to the fact that they should adopt the affectations of their privileged
competitors.").
77. See Aries & Seider, supra note 76, at 431; Harrison, supra note 6, at 121.
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The hiring tendencies that this Section analyzes do not necessarily signify that law
schools set out to hire professors from economically advantaged backgrounds. As
noted, graduates of Ivy-Plus and similar colleges could simply be overrepresented at
the elite law schools from which law schools generally hire. The preference for
graduates of elite colleges could also be implicit inasmuch as hiring committees regard
candidates with these backgrounds as more relatable. 78 Nevertheless, hiring mostly
graduates of Ivy-Plus and similar colleges overwhelmingly benefits individuals with
high SESs even if hiring committees do not place special emphasis on college pedigree.
IV. DIscussIoN
Law professor positions are highly sought after. Since family wealth is correlated
with educational attainment and pedigree, high-SES individuals will have advantages
in the law professor hiring market. As this Essay shows, the filtering out of individuals
from more modest backgrounds occurs well before their choice of law school. In this
Section, I examine why law schools might favor candidates with elite college pedigrees
even though undergraduate education does not provide legal training. 79 I then connect
law schools' hiring practices to the legal education's marginalization of the experiences
of low- and middle-income people. 0
A.

UndergraduatePedigree, Class, and Law School Hiring

Critics have long charged that law school hiring is elitist and infected with class
bias, but these criticisms have failed to gain traction.81 In the absence of reliable data
on socioeconomic diversity in law schools, the legal academy has largely ignored or
downplayed the ramifications of hiring law professors who are mostly graduates of
elite law schools.
Law schools may be justified to assign some weight to law school pedigree. Law
schools can devote only so much time to evaluating candidates, and law school
pedigree need not be a perfect proxy for it to be useful to hiring committees. For
example, if law schools are primarily seeking scholarly potential in new hires, it is
logical that they would favor graduates of institutions that are known to have a strong
academic orientation.8 2 Even ardent critics of modem legal education have conceded
that law schools are not "trade schools" and that their students need grounding in
theory and interdisciplinary considerations.83 One must also acknowledge the
importance of network effects: elite law schools offer access to leading scholars who

78.

See LAUREN A. RIVERA, PEDIGREE: How ELITE STUDENTS GET ELITE JOBS

143-45

(2015)

(observing that employment decisions in professional fields such as law depend on assessments of "fit," and
candidates from economically privileged social ranks are more apt to demonstrate the requisite fit).
79.

See infra Part IVA.

80.

See infra Part IV.B.

81.

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

82. See Hessick, supra note 21; see also Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a
Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1231, 1236 (1991)
("[P]rofessors who once trained prospective lawyers have, at elite law schools, become true academicians,
highly specialized and almost exclusively engaged in pure . .. research." (footnote omitted)).
83. E.g., Harry T. Edwards, Another 'Postscript" to "the Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession,"69 WASH. L. REV. 561, 564 (1994).
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can mentor and collaborate with aspiring professors." Even in an era where candidates
have developed bodies of research, some recourse to pedigree may be unavoidable
because, unlike many other fields, there is little consensus on standards for evaluating
legal scholarship, and professors differ in the methods that they use and their intended
audiences."
Law schools' hiring practices look far more problematic, however, when law
professors' college educations are considered. The archetypal law professor hire did not
just attend an elite law school. Rather, based on the entry-level professor sample, she
also likely attended an Ivy-Plus college or other elite private college. A remarkable
40% of law professors hired to tenure-track positions from 2017 to 2019 attended
Ivy-Plus colleges. Notwithstanding the meritocratic ideal of poor students gaining
admission into elite educational institutions, Ivy-Plus and similar colleges draw
students predominantly from the top income quintile and graduate few students from
lower-income backgrounds. In hiring from these institutions, law schools all but
guarantee that the professoriate will be made up of individuals from the top of the U.S.
economic pyramid. Legal academia may not be entirely closed off to lower-income
people, but the system is stacked in favor of economically advantaged individuals
because they have the requisite resources to prevail in a "massive, multistage
86
meritocratic tournament."
Hence, the law professor pipeline is quite narrow and is further narrowed by the
choice of law school, postgraduate employment, and the completion of fellowships and
PhDs. To the extent that law schools are managing to hire some candidates from less
privileged backgrounds despite the foregoing entry barriers, elite socialization has
likely rendered their socioeconomic origins largely undetectable; in sociological terms,
these candidates have assimilated the habitus of the legal academics. 7 Professors from
working-class backgrounds have written poignantly of steps taken to mask their
social-class identities.
Law schools do not likely endeavor to favor candidates with high SES. Indeed,
many law professors are politically committed to economic and social equality. But, as

.

84. See George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 16 ("[H]igh-ability students will choose more prestigious
institutions because of the greater job opportunities that these schools afford. Higher ranked schools also may
provide a stronger network of potential collaborators . .
85.

See id. at 15-16.

86.

MARKOVITS, supra note 15, at 7.

87. Habitus, a term associated with French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, refers to "a system of embodied
dispositions which generate practice in accordance with the structural principles of the social world." Roy
Nash, Bourdieu on Education and Social and Cultural Reproduction, 11 BRIT. J. Soc. EDUC. 431, 432-33
(1990); see also Diane Reay et al., Strangers in Paradise'? Working-Class Students in Elite Universities, 43
Soc. 1103, 1110-11 (2009) (documenting working-class students' adaption and refashioning of habitus to elite
university environment).
88. See Carmen G. Gonzilez, Women of Color in Legal Education. Challenging the Presumption of
Incompetence, FED. LAW., July 2014, at 49, 53-54 (2014) (summarizing accounts of working-class
academics); see also Michael Z. Green, "Just Another Little Black Boy from the South Side of
Chicago". Overcoming Obstacles and Breaking Down Barriers To

Improve Diversity in the Law

Professoriate, 31 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 135, 147-48 (2015) (describing financial difficulties in leaving
legal practice to complete a low-paid fellowship at a top-tier law school to improve prospects on the hiring
market).
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products of elite schooling, they have little reason to question U.S. higher education's
meritocratic pretensions, particularly when it deploys nominally meritocratic admission
criteria that conceal the effects of class.8 9
The current system effectively invites law schools to prioritize pedigree in a
number of ways. For example, AALS FRC participants must submit resumes9 0 and
complete standardized forms that place undergraduate and law school education before
publications, professional experience, and other relevant information. The AALS could
discourage reliance on pedigree altogether by having candidates list their degrees
without associated alma maters. Law schools' failure to implement these types of
reforms indicates that they consider the preoccupation with pedigree to be natural and
benign.
Individual law schools could take additional steps to attract candidates from less
privileged backgrounds. For example, they could advertise preferences for
first-generation professionals and choose to interview a greater number of qualified
candidates from public colleges and other institutions that the wealthy do not
dominate.91 In interviews, hiring committees could inquire about hardships that
candidates have overcome. However, at the vast majority of law schools, the hiring
process centers on a candidate's ability to defend a single paper and interact amiably
with faculty. 9 2
Future research ideally in concert with the AALS-should examine whether law
schools' seeming preference for graduates of elite colleges is independent of their
preference for graduates of elite law schools. If the preference for elite college pedigree
is independent of the preference for law school pedigree, this gives credence to the
notion that class bias affects law school hiring. 93 Hiring committees may tacitly believe
that only graduates of elite colleges possess the requisite acumen for legal academia
even though class, and not acumen, often drives college enrollment decisions. 94 An
independent effect for college pedigree could also suggest that hiring committees prefer
95
FRC candidates who manifest interests and behaviors associated with high SES.

89.

See Binder & Abel, supra note 72, at 42.

90. See Zillman et al., supra note 27, at 347.
91. See Harrison,supra note 6, at 121 (suggesting that law faculty can look for public school degrees,
glamourless summerjobs, and other subtle indications of economic disadvantage).
92. See Gordon, supra note 29, at 145 ("[H]iring choices are made, through the AALS hiring process,
on the basis of . . . a thirty-minute interview, and a one-day visit to campus during which no one faculty
member can spend more than a couple of hours assessing a candidate's skills and potential.").
93. Some law schools may have nonclassist reasons to pay attention to candidates' undergraduate
educations. For example, law schools in geographically undesirable areas may wish to target candidates who
have geographic ties to these areas via college attendance, and religiously affiliated law schools may seek
candidates who attended religiously affiliated colleges.
94. See Harrison, supra note 6, at 121 (claiming that hiring committees are uninterested in and even
scornful of economic disadvantage). The phenomenon of focusing on institutional prestige rather than
individual achievement is sometimes referred to as "institutional ascription." George & Yoon, supra note 11,
at 14-15; see also Lisa Tsui, ReproducingSocial Inequalities Through Higher Education: CriticalThinking as

Valued Capital, 72 J. NEGRO EDUC. 318, 320 (2003) ("[M]erely being affiliated with a prestigious institution
signals to others, especially such important gatekeepers as graduate school admission committees and
corporate employers, one's elite status and capability for high performance." (citations omitted)).
95. See RIVERA, supra note 78, at 3 ("[H]iring decisions that appear on the surface to be based only by
individual merit are subtly yet powerfully shaped by applicants' socioeconomic backgrounds.").
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Professor Daniel Gordon claims that Wiring committees "conflat[e] intellectualism with
ample financial resources" and regard applicants without these resources as
"outsider[s]." 96 There is little in the faculty selection process that would counteract
such tendencies or work to the advantage of individuals from working-class
backgrounds. 97
Conversely, Wiring committees could prefer graduates of elite colleges simply
because they are overrepresented in elite law schools. As noted above, some
consideration of law school pedigree may be unavoidable. However, for a number of
reasons, ranging from lack of financial resources and information about educational
hierarchies to the nature of the standardized testing process, lower-income individuals
are less likely to follow pathways that lead to elite law schools. 98 These nontraditional
pathways should not disqualify them from legal academia.
The value of law school pedigree as a proxy for scholarly potential is also
diminishing. Candidates now have developed bodies of research to share with hiring
committees that are better markers of scholarly potential than their law school
pedigrees. The mere lack of consensus on standards for assessing legal scholarship
hardly justifies the academy's continuing dependence on law school pedigree. 99
Lastly, although this Essay's main focus is socioeconomic diversity, SES and
racial diversity are comected. 100 Limited numbers of racial minorities attend Ivy-Plus
and similar colleges, and fewer still continue on to elite law schools and manifest
interest in law teaching. 101 To increase racial diversity in the legal academy, law
schools must be open to pedigrees that have historically been excluded. For example,
only one hire in the entire law professor sample attended a historically black college.
This college also happened to be the most socioeconomically diverse institution in the
dataset. Hiring from a wider cross section of colleges and law schools would widen the
professor pipeline and send a strong signal that law schools are open to a variety of
backgrounds and experiences. Continuing to emphasize law school pedigree-on top of
other requirements such as the completion of a low-paid fellowship or PhD
program largely limits the academy to socioeconomically advantaged groups. As the
next Part sets out, a reconsideration of Wiring practices may also make legal education
more attuned to non-elite experiences of the legal system.
B.

Legal Education and the Experiences ofLow- and Middle-Income People

Thus far, this Essay has used entry-level Wiring information and college
socioeconomic data to estimate law professors' socioeconomic backgrounds. The
apparent iring preference for the types of candidates who attended elite colleges and
law schools also has pernicious effects on legal education. A law professor need not be

96. Gordon, supra note 29 at 153.
97. See Harrison,supra note 6, at 121.
98. See Lawprofblawg & Bush, supra note 14, at 345.
99. See George & Yoon, supra note 11, at 37.
100. See generally Tsui, supra note 94, at 323-24 (summarizing research on education, socioeconomic
status, and race).
101. Id.; see also Green, supra note 88, at 144-45 (summarizing barriers faced by aspiring law
professors who are racial minorities).
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from a lower-income background to be sensitive to issues of wealth and class, but
firsthand experience with the legal system's inequities is invaluable to understanding
and conveying its treatment of lower-income people. 1 0 2
To this day, the predominant form of law school instruction is the case method
that Christopher Columbus Langdell created at Harvard Law School. 103 Langdell
viewed law as a science and maintained that aspiring lawyers could deduce its
principles through a close reading of appellate cases. 104 Scholars have long excoriated
the case method on methodological and pedagogical grounds.105 However, an
overlooked problem is that it provides students with a wholly unrealistic impression of
the legal system's operations: what is a very rare event a case resulting in a
well-reasoned appellate decision is presented to law students as the norm. 106
Disputes in the civil legal system rarely end with an appellate court's issuance of
an opinion. Before an appellate court can opine, the parties must hire and pay attorneys
to handle the matter, fully contest the matter before a lower court, and then file and
argue an appeal of the lower court's ruling. Each of these steps requires time and
substantial resources. Few cases reach trial, let alone receive appellate review. 107 Yet,

102. See Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education. How Law Schools Reproduce
Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1172 (2008) ("[E]ducational institutions'
implicit role in the propagation of existing systems of domination automatically reduces the authority of
anyone who wishes to criticize the existing system from within."); see also Harrison, supra note 6, at 120
("[A] great deal of evidence suggests that class has an impact on one's sense of justice, expectations, and
self-esteem.").
103. Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L. REV. 597,
597-98 (2007).
104. See C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vii-ix (2d ed. 1879);
see also Russell L. Weaver, Langdell 's Legacy. Living with the Case Method, 36 ViLL. L. REV. 517, 527-28
(1991) ("Langdell viewed law as a 'science' and believed that it should be studied by scientific methods. In his
view, a scientific method involved an examination of 'original sources'-the printed reports of cases."
(footnotes omitted)).
105. See, e.g., Rakoff & Minow, supra note 103, at 601 ("'Truth,' in modern and post-modern views, is
much more constructed, much less simply discovered, than the Langdellian model of 'science' supposes. What
is known . .
is much more contextual and perspectival."); W. David Slawson, Changing How We Teach. A
Critique of the Case Method, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 343, 345 (2000) ("Another drawback of the case method, at
least for the common-law subjects, is that some of the laws to be learned are so poorly understood, or subject
to so much disagreement, that a selection of a case or small number of cases to represent the subjects is bound
to be arbitrary."); Weaver, supra note 104, at 591 ("[The case method] affords students insufficient insight into
how attorneys develop cases. Students read appellate opinions that involve cases already processed by both
lawyers and judges, but they do not see legal problems in their unrefined form."); see also Stephen Wizner,
The Law School Clinic. Legal Education in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1929, 1931-32
(2002) (noting the rise of legal realism and rejection of Langdell's formalist views of the law).
106. See Benjamin H. Barton, A Tale of Two Case Methods, 75 TENN. L. REV. 233, 242 (2008)
(suggesting that the case method relies on students forgetting their life experiences and expertise).
107. The literature on the so-called vanishing trial is voluminous and includes both popular and
scholarly works. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial. An Examination of Trials andRelated Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2004); William G. Young, Vanishing
Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 73 (2006); Benjamin Weiser,
Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html
[https://perma.cc/
5PKD-WP84].
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resource constraints are rarely part of Socratic dialogues. As Professor Lucille Jewel
explains:
When law professors review cases and charge that the negative outcome for
the plaintiff was a result of the lawyer's failure to ask questions or failure to
take the time to investigate the facts more thoroughly, they present the idea
that legal solutions are to be considered in space where time, money, and
other concepts related to making a living do not come into play. 08
For many low- and middle-income people facing civil legal problems, the mere
iring of a lawyer is a major obstacle. According to a Legal Services Corporation
study, low- and middle-income Americans turn to attorneys for legal assistance in only
20% of situations. 109 When low- and middle-income people are forced to go to court,
they often represent themselves. For example, self-representation rates are over 95% in
proceedings involving personal plights such as eviction and child support. 110 The
idealized adversarial system in which both parties are ably represented by counsel
before a neutral fact finder is far more elusive than legal educators let on.'
The appellate decisions discussed in law school classrooms also contain extensive
reasoning. This is understandable from a pedagogical perspective-students cannot
divine legal rules from cursory analyses. However, appellate courts routinely decide
appeals without providing their reasoning. These decisions usually take the form of
unpublished, nonprecedential opinions. 112 Nearly 90% of merits decisions in the U.S.
Courts of Appeals take this form; overwhelmingly they pertain to indigent litigants. 113
These decisions lay bare the two-tiered nature of the legal system and constitute law
only in the sense that they are an exercise of government power. 1
Legal education does not wholly ignore these realities-a professor, dean, or
distinguished speaker may raise them under the rubric of "access to justice" or perhaps
after evoking the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright.11 5 Some law
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Jewel, supra note 102, at 1218 (footnote omitted).

109.

LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF

Low-INCOME
AMERICANS
29
(2017),
FullReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDR6-98N3].
110.

http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-

Id. at 9.

111. See Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice. Why Access to Lawyers
Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will Help, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 969,
972 (2004) ("[T]he use of the market as the primary mechanism for distributing legal services guarantees
significantly unequal justice under law. The more resources a party has, the better quality lawyering they can
buy. . . . Rather than being the exception, inequality under law is more frequently the rule." (footnote
omitted)).
112. Merritt E. McAlister, "DownrightIndifference": Examining UnpublishedDecisions in the Federal
Courts ofAppeals, 118 MICH. L. REV. 533, 535 (2020). One well-known former federal judge-a defender of
unpublished, nonprecedential opinions-described them as "not safe for human consumption." Id. (quoting
Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to ProposedFederalRule ofAppellate Procedure32.1, FED. LAW., June 2004, at
36, 38). The absence of reason giving is both marginalizing to litigants and threatening to the legal system's
legitimacy. Id. at 541.
113.

Id. at 535-37.

114. See id. at 536 ("Traditional appellate process . .
continues for the system's haves. But for its
have-nots, the promise of an appeal as of right has become little more than a rubber stamp . . . .").
115. 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.").
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students will work with lower-income clients in law clinics. But students who are
themselves from lower-income backgrounds are likely to find the law school alienating
because they will learn the law from the perspective of professors whose experiences
with the legal system are starkly different than their own.1 16 To the extent that they
occur at all, well-meaning professor-led discussions about "access to justice," Gideon,
and class-based inequalities can backfire because they risk stigmatizing low- and
middle-income people as charity cases (or worse) as opposed to full and equal
participants in the legal system.
In earlier eras, law schools trained students to provide legal services mostly to
propertied interests.' 7 Contemporary law schools purport to prepare students to serve
all segments of society while characterizing the legal system's treatment of the poor
and middle class as orthogonal to its actual operations. As Professor Rhode observes:
Unlike medicine, which has well-developed courses, schools and
concentrations devoted to public health, law does little to prepare
practitioners to address structural problems in the delivery of legal services
and the administration of justice. As a consequence, many students graduate
without an informed understanding of how the law affects those who cannot
afford to invoke it. 118
Law schools and law faculties are not geared to provide this "informed understanding,"
leaving graduates unprepared to represent lower-income individuals and to address
their complex mix of legal and socioeconomic needs.1 19
The marginalization of the experiences of lower-income individuals extends to
faculty research. Although scholarly trends ebb and flow, legal scholarship has
historically legitimated the legal system by emphasizing its neutral, scientific character
and by tinkering at its margins. 120 The individual law professor is well advised to play
it safe by ploughing this familiar terrain. 121 Of course, some legal scholars grapple
seriously with socioeconomic inequality, and there are scholarly movements focusing
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See Harrison, supra note 6, at 120-2 1.
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See ABEL, supra note 14, at 128-29.

118. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice. An Agendafor Legal Education and Research, 62 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 531, 545 (2013).
119. Id.; see also Andrew M. Perlman, The Public's Unmet Need for Legal Services & What Law
Schools Can Do About It, 148 DAEDALUS 75, 76 (2019) ("[Law schools] have trained students to engage in
highly customized and expensive forms of lawyering, leaving them ill-equipped to . . increase access to legal

services.").
120. See, e.g., Abel, supra note 19, at 87; Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90
YALE L.J. 1275, 1276 (1981) ("[L]egal scholarship is one of the things that creates [the unequal society] I've
just described-creates it, sustains it, legitimates it."); Peter Gabel, Book Review, 91 HARV. L. REV. 302, 315
(1977) (reviewing RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977)) ("It is only by tmnsforming
[economic] processes themselves rather than by tinkering with a legal system that legitimates them that we can
create the possible conditions for a concrete justice . . . .").
121. See Aviam Soifer, MuSings, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 20, 24 (1987) ("Recently, there have been too
many poignant incidents in which tenure was denied to scholars whose career paths were out of the ordinary,
or whose writing did not fit comfortably within established patterns."). The difficulties faced by early
adherents of the critical legal studies movement are a cautionary tale. See generally Mark Tushnet, Critical
Legal Studies. A Political History, 100 Yale L.J. 1515, 1530-34 (1991) (describing how the senior faculty
perceived early critical legal studies scholars' lack of interest in doctrinal scholarship as a "lack of judgment,"
playing a role in their firing).
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on class and poverty. 12 2 But the need for such movements indicates the extent to which
legal scholarship treats these issues as ancillary to the study of law.
Topic selection is another manifestation of this marginalization. To obtain tenure
and build national reputations, law professors are incentivized to write about
prestigious topics that will appeal to their colleagues as well as law review editors at
elite law schools. 1 23 This creates a feedback loop whereby professors and law reviews
reinforce their status by continuing to write on these topics while neglecting less
prestigious ones that may be of more practical utility and impact.
For example, legal scholarship almost entirely eschews state courts in favor of
federal courts, even though the former hear all but a sliver of civil cases and lie "at the
heart of our civic, economic, and social life." 1 24 Administrative courts also receive
comparatively little scrutiny, notwithstanding their prodigious caseloads and impact. 125
The number of scholars who focus on crucial government programs such as Social
Security Disability Insurance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program relied upon by tens of millions of
Americans would barely fill a seminar room.
Might the state of affairs in legal education be different were the legal academy to
include more individuals from lower-income backgrounds? It is impossible to state
definitively, but increased representation could disrupt prevailing pedagogical
orthodoxies and open new avenues of scholarly inquiry. Professors who have
experienced the inequities of the legal system firsthand should be able to more
effectively address these inequities and impress them upon students of varied
socioeconomic backgrounds. 126 With a critical mass of professors from these
backgrounds, there would likely be greater demand for legal scholarship that takes the
experiences of low- and middle-income people seriously. However, as long as law
schools pay little heed to socioeconomic diversity in hiring, non-elite perspectives will
continue to be underrepresented.
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(2016). For example, the Social Security Administration's Office of Disability Adjudication and Review hears
over seven hundred thousand claims a year. Id. at 1850. By way of comparison, the federal district courts
collectively heard 358,563 cases in 2018. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. COURTS,
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CONCLUSION

This Essay has sought to provide empirical evidence of law professors'
socioeconomic backgrounds. Intentional or not, law schools appear to hire graduates of
colleges dominated by families from the top income quintile. Law professors who are
from less advantaged backgrounds probably surmounted numerous obstacles to attain
their positions, beginning with admission into elite colleges. Future research should
measure the precise effects of attending an Ivy-Plus or other elite college on the
likelihood of obtaining a law professor position.
Law schools may not appreciate the extent to which their preoccupation with
various types of pedigree affects the legal academy's socioeconomic diversity. The
notion of leading colleges as meritocratic bastions is deeply ingrained. 12 7 Yet, these
colleges enroll few students from lower-income backgrounds, and the lower-income
students who do attend these colleges often struggle to adapt to their privileged
environs and peers. The legal academy cannot achieve a socioeconomically diverse
professoriate without being open to a variety of educational backgrounds.
Of course, graduates of elite colleges and law schools will always have some
advantages in the law professor hiring market. They will have generally worked in the
most prestigious legal practice settings, completed the most desirable clerkships, and
gained admission into the best fellowship and doctoral programs. But this is hardly
reason for law schools to compound these advantages further.
The legal academy touts its commitment to diversity but hires mostly from the
toniest colleges and law schools. A reexamination of law schools' hiring practices is
long overdue. The economically advantaged should not have a virtual monopoly over
legal education.
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